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ABSTRACT 
 
Survival of Potential Ebola Virus Surrogates (Bacteriophages Φ6 and MS2) on PAPR 
Hood Material 
 
 
Cody J. Clemmons 
 
04/23/2019 
 
 
  
 
 
INTRODUCTION:  One of the main lines of defense protecting healthcare workers from 
serious pathogens, like Ebola, during patient care is personal protective equipment (PPE). 
Personal protective equipment is wearable protection items worn by HCW to prevent the spread 
of disease, both from patient to HCW to patient and from patient to HCW.  As PPE is barrier 
protection; it can become contaminated on its surface during patient care. This poses a risk when 
it is time to doff PPE at the end of use. Doffing is the detailed process of removing the PPE after 
patient care. Even with comprehensive training, self-contamination continues to occur.  As self-
contamination with PPE during the doffing process has been documented through several 
studies, the question of survivability of infectious diseases on PAPR hoods needs to be 
investigated.   
 
AIM:  The aim of this study is to determine the recovery and survival of bacteriophages phi6 
and MS2 on shroud Powered Air Purifying Respirator Material (PAPR) at 45% relative 
humidity.  
 
RESULTS:  The linear regression line for MS2 at 45%RH showed a slope of -0.0099 ±0.0054, 
while the linear regression line for phi6 at 45%RH showed a slope of -0.028 ± 0.027. The 
projected log reduction calculated from the regression lines for phi6 is estimated to have a ~1 
log10 reduction at 24 hours at 45% RH, MS2 is estimated to have a ~1 log10 reduction by 96 
hours.  MS2 is estimated to only have a .25 log10 reduction at 24 hours at 45% RH. 
 
DISCUSSION: Both bacteriophage MS2 and phi6 survive on shroud PAPR hood material for 
over 24 hours at 45% relative humidity levels. The results provide evidence that both types of 
virus survive on PAPR hood material after the longest patient encounter, which is projected to be 
8 hours. If a HCW’s PPE were to be contaminated during their patient contact time, the virus is 
still active once the HCW doffs their PPE and the potential for self-contamination could occur. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Background 
The Ebola virus has been the cause of approximately 26 outbreaks in Africa since 1976, 
including three outbreaks since 2014 (WHO, 2019).  Currently, the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo is battling an ongoing struggle with the spread of Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) across the 
country with around 848 cases (WHO, 2019).  As hundreds of patients require healthcare to combat 
this highly infectious disease, the question of how healthcare workers (HCW) can be protected 
from transmission during patient care is particularly urgent. During the EVD 2013-2015 outbreak 
across Africa, the amount of HCW diagnosed with EVD was the highest reported in recorded 
history of EVD outbreaks, totaling 875 confirmed HCW cases out of 28,616 confirmed cases 
(Weber, Fischer, Wohl, and Rutala, 2015).  While EVD is of great concern internationally for 
HCW, there is concern in the United States; patients with EVD were evacuated to the U.S for 
clinical care in the 2014 outbreak. Internationally and in the United States, serious pathogens of 
concern that may pose risks to healthcare providers also include Marburg, Lassa, pandemic 
influenza, and other emerging viral diseases. These pathogens can be both enveloped and non-
enveloped viruses, and infection of HCW who provide care for these patients remains of great 
concern.  
One of the main lines of defense protecting HCWs from serious pathogens like Ebola 
during patient care is personal protective equipment (PPE). According to the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention (2018), personal protective equipment is wearable protection items worn 
by HCW to prevent the spread of disease, both from patient to HCW to patient and from patient to 
HCW. PPE is a barrier approach, meant to prevent contact with substances that pose risks, 
including chemicals, body fluids, droplets, aerosols, and pathogens. PPE will vary for each disease, 
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depending on the route of transmission. As EVD is transmitted through direct contact with an EVD 
positive patient, their fluids, blood or contaminated surfaces, PPE is required for any patient 
interaction (CDC, 2018).  EVD positive patients require the highest level of PPE, as this is a highly 
infectious virus and considered a risk group 4 viral agent. Risk group 4 agents most commonly 
cause very serious or deadly human disease for which treatment protocols are usually not 
obtainable (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2015).  In a laboratory setting, Ebola 
virus would only be manipulated within a biosafety level 4 (BSL4) containment laboratory, which 
requires a ventilated protective suit with an attached cord for breathing air. A BSL4 laboratory and 
the utilized PPE is the highest level of protection there is for highly infectious pathogens.  The 
CDC (2018) currently recommends the following PPE when working with patients with confirmed 
EVD or unknown infectious diseases that display similar symptoms to EVD; single use 
impermeable coverall or gown, respiratory protection, eye protection, two pairs of disposable 
gloves, disposable boot covers, and a disposable single use apron.  The goal of this PPE is for the 
provider to have no exposed skin or mucous membranes during patient care (CDC, 2018). Unlike 
PPE routinely worn in other types of laboratories or healthcare facilities, this type of PPE also 
includes some type of respiratory protection.  
Respiratory protection can include either a N95 mask respirator (Figure 2.1) or a powered 
air purifying respirator (PAPR) (Figure 1.2).  The National Institute for Occupational Safety and 
Health (NIOSH) (2018) describes a N95 respirator as a respirator that only covers the nose and 
mouth area; if eye splashes or exposure are a concern it must be combined with separate eye 
protection. The N95 respirator filters out approximately 95% of airborne particles. N95 
respirators also must fit very closely to the face and requires fit testing by trained professionals. 
Additionally, N95 respirators can be more difficult to breathe in as they sit directly on your 
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mouth and nose, a face mask and eye protection are also needed with this type of respirator. It 
also cannot be worn by every individual. NIOSH (2018) describes a PAPR unit as a battery 
operated type of respirator. The unit utilizes a blower that delivers positive airflow (one 
direction) through a HEPA filter prior to the HCW breathing in the air; the HEPA filter also 
provides more air exchanges than a N95 mask.  Another feature of the PAPR is that the hood 
attachment completely covers the face (without sitting directly on the mouth and nose) and a 
shroud PAPR hood covers the entire face, head, and neck.  A PAPR is often preferred when 
working with EVD due to its protection against droplet and airborne particles, as well as 
protection against splashes. The units are bigger and more cumbersome when compared to a N95 
respirator.  Fit testing is not required for the use of a PAPR; therefore, it can be used more 
readily by those with facial hair or in an environment where fit testing is not available (NIOSH, 
2018).   
 
Figure 1.1: Medical Products LTD: N95 respirator  
 
Figure 1.2: Enviro Safety Products: Shroud PAPR hood and blower 
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PPE is barrier protection; as such, it can become contaminated on its surface during 
patient care or laboratory work. This poses a risk when it is time to doff PPE at the end of use. 
Doffing is the detailed process of removing the PPE after patient care. For a high containment 
hospital room, a HCW would wear several layers of PPE, including scrubs, booties, Tyvek, 
apron, and double gloves. For shroud PAPR hoods, the physical challenge of doffing can be 
especially difficult due to the large size of the hood, multiple layers of material, and the heavy 
blower unit. Removing all of the pieces of PPE can be a cumbersome task and open up the 
opportunity for self-contamination. Specific training for the doffing process and continued 
proficiency testing are key in maintaining proper doffing techniques. However, even with 
comprehensive training, self-contamination continues to occur.  As self-contamination with PPE 
during the doffing process has been documented through studies such as Casanova, Alfano-
Sobsey, Rutala, Weber, and Sobsey (2008), Casanova et al. (2016) and Lim, Cha, Chae, and Jo 
(2015) the question of survivability of infectious diseases on PAPR hoods needs to be 
investigated.   
For this study, two bacteriophages were tested on small sections of shroud PAPR hood 
material.  A bacteriophage is a virus that infects bacteria. To reflect the behavior of a range of 
human viruses, an enveloped (phi6) and a non-enveloped (MS2) bacteriophage were used in this 
study.  Bacteriophages are often utilized as surrogate viruses as while they mimic other 
infectious viruses; however, they do not require the high containment laboratories, the cost, and 
extensive biosafety training that the infectious virus requires. Previous studies such as Casanova 
and Waka (2013) analyzed the survivability of phi6 on a N95 respirator and Tung-Thompson et 
al. (2015) studied MS2 bacteriophage through aerosolization mechanisms to simulate infectious 
diseases. Additionally, Casanova et al. (2016) researched both phi6 and MS2 bacteriophages for 
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a study that analyzed how HCW can self-contaminate themselves during the doffing process of 
select PPE. Furthermore, a study focusing on the survivability of both bacteriophages on shroud 
PAPR hood material has not yet been published.  
An environmental component that factors into the survivability of both bacteriophages on 
shroud PAPR hood material is relative humidity (RH). Several studies have explored 
bacteriophage survivability at multiple RH ranges from 20% RH through 98% RH and have 
demonstrated that infectivity and survival can be affected by RH.  A study by Casanova, Rutala, 
Weber, and Sobsey (2010) demonstrates that RH is an important factor for survivability of virus 
on surfaces.  Prussin et al. (2018) conducted a study that states that RH is the most important 
component when looking at virus infectivity in droplets and those that land on surfaces.  Further 
studies for both enveloped and non-enveloped viruses should include RH as a factor as this 
environmental component plays an important role for virus survivability on PPE.  
Purpose of the Study 
As outbreaks of EVD and other highly infectious disease outbreaks continue to occur, 
HCW need to be protected against a variety of types of transmission. Shroud PAPR units are 
being used already in laboratory and healthcare settings in order to protect workers from 
infectious substances, including EVD. In order to design ways to prevent self-contamination by 
doffing of a shroud PAPR unit, evaluating the survivability of both phi6 and MS2 bacteriophages 
is important.  Therefore, the objective of this research is to determine the survivability of both 
phi6 and MS2 bacteriophages on shroud PAPR hood material at 45%RH over selected time 
points within a 24 hour window.  
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
Background 
 An article in the MMWR-CDC reported that in 2014, eleven cases of the Ebola virus 
disease (EVD) were diagnosed in the United States. While nine of the cases were patients that 
had contracted EVD prior to entering the US, two of the patients were healthcare workers that 
contracted the disease while performing patient care on the individuals already diagnosed with 
EVD.  While both HCWs wore personal protective equipment (PPE), per the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention (CDC) guidelines, they still contracted EVD (Bell BP, Damon IK, 
Jernigan DB, et al. 2016). The World Health Organization (WHO) (2019) has reported that 
HCWs are 21-32 times more likely to contract EVD, versus a non HCW. During the 2014-2015 
outbreak, over 8,000 health care workers, worldwide, responded (WHO, 2019). Overall, 
approximately 875 confirmed HCW cases of EVD were reported during the outbreak (Weber, 
Fischer, Wohl, and Rutala; 2015).  As PPE is an important line of defense against the 
transmission of highly infectious diseases between the patient and healthcare worker, the PPE 
can be easily contaminated by a patient infected with EVD.  Common symptoms of EVD include 
coughing, vomiting, and diarrhea.  Any contact with these body fluids could contaminate the 
healthcare worker’s PPE.  
 The investigation into how EVD was transmitted to the HCWs explored the possibility 
of self-contamination when assisting with or doffing their PPE (Petti et al, 2016).  Furthermore, 
the 2014 outbreak made hospitals and governing officials reevaluate the plans in place for further 
outbreaks of highly infectious diseases, updating current CDC guidelines, reassess the current 
PPE requirements and training protocols for proper PPE donning and doffing when providing 
patient care to those infected with a highly infectious disease.  
7 
 
Respirators 
 Current CDC guidelines recommend the use of a N95 respirator or a powered, air-
purifying respirator (PAPR) when working with patients specifically diagnosed ore suspected 
EVD (CDC, 2018 ). A N95 respirator can protect at 95% efficiency against certain particles (0.1 
to 0.3 micron), aerosols and droplets sizes; however, is not equivalent to higher end filters, such 
as a HEPA (high efficiency particulate air) filter.   A HEPA filter can remove up to 99.97% of 
particles that are greater than 0.3um in diameter (CDC, 2018).  Additionally, no power source is 
required, they are easier to use with a stethoscope, and lastly, there is not a noise barrier. While 
there are many advantages to using a N95, there are disadvantages such as the required fit testing 
prior to use, they are harder to breathe in, and potential user error when donning (Roberts, 2014).  
Furthermore, the N95 must be worn with additional eye protection and a face shield. More of the 
HCWs skin is exposed and there is the potential for inward leakage if the respirator is exposed to 
body fluids, which is highly likely with an EVD patient (Coia et al., 2013).   
 A study by Roberts (2014) analyzes PAPRs and N95s to determine which type of 
respirator should be used with highly infectious agents.  Per NIOSH (2018), a PAPR unit is a 
battery operated type of respirator. The unit utilizes a blower that delivers positive airflow (one 
direction) through a HEPA filter prior to the HCW breathing in the air; the HEPA filter also 
provides more air exchanges than a N95 mask.  Another feature of the PAPR is that the hood 
attachment completely covers the face and a shroud PAPR hood covers the entire face, head, and 
neck. These features provided enhanced protection over the use of a N95 respirator. A few 
downfalls to the use of the PAPR include the noise associated with the blower unit. This can 
create difficulty when a HCW is using a stethoscope and creates a barrier for the stethoscope ear 
piece. Additionally, the PAPR unit is much larger and more cumbersome than the smaller N95 
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respirator. While the N95 respirator can be easily doffed from the face, due to the size of the 
PAPR hood, doffing can be more difficult and hence have the potential for a greater chance of 
self-contamination (Roberts, 2014).  Coia et al. (2013) and Bunyan et al. (2013) have both 
provided research that establishes that respiratory protection when dealing with a patient with a 
highly infectious disease is vital in the prevention of transmission to the HCW. Additionally, 
both studies agree that a PAPR unit provides the greatest protection, but does require in depth 
training on doffing procedures in order to avoid self-contamination after patient care.  
Bacteriophage Φ6 
 The use of bacteriophage Φ6 has been utilized in several studies to act as a surrogate to 
an enveloped virus, such as EVD.  To study EVD directly, a high containment laboratory (HCL) 
would be required.  High containment laboratories are extremely costly and required highly 
trained scientists. Most importantly, there is a greater risk when handling the EVD virus directly; 
therefore, gaining the information needed about the virus through a surrogate virus is ideal. 
Using a surrogate is less costly, can be conducted in lower level biosafety laboratories, and can 
be conducted more safely by removing the human pathogen aspect.  One area of research that 
bacteriophage Ø6 is essential in studying is the infectivity and survivability of the virus on PPE 
that protects HCWs, specifically those that treat patients with highly infectious diseases. Several 
studies (Casanova et al. 2018; Brown et al., 2016; and Casanova et al., 2009) have heavily 
researched the bacteriophage Ø6 surrogate virus to determine the survival of enveloped viruses 
on personal protective equipment.  All three studies conclude that bacteriophage Φ6 survives for 
longer than a standard session of patient care and can last up to 24 hours on PPE.  Additionally, a 
study by Prussin et al. (2018) analyzed the infectivity of bacteriophage Φ6 with regards to 
relative humidity, absolute humidity, and temperature. The research demonstrates the complex 
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relationship between these factors and the infectivity of bacteriophage Φ6 (Prussin et al., 2018).  
These studies not only provide information on enveloped viruses such as EVD, but additional 
viruses such as influenza, coronavirus, SARS, and MERS which are all highly infectious 
pathogens.  
Bacteriophage MS2 
 While enveloped viruses are of high concern in the healthcare field, non-enveloped 
viruses can also cause outbreaks and require HCWs to render patient care.  For studies analyzing 
non-enveloped viruses, bacteriophage MS2 is often utilized. Brady et al. (2017) utilized 
bacteriophage MS2 to analyze the potential for self-contamination when HCWs doff a N95 
filtering respirator.  This information provides evidence that this surrogate virus has longevity 
(past 24 hours) on PPE and can indeed be the cause of self-contamination if the PPE is doffed 
improperly.  Highlighting the requirement for proper and frequent training were also noted in the 
study in order to prevent self-contamination.  An additional study, conducted by Tung-
Thompson et al. (2015), performed their research with bacteriophage MS2 in order to mimic the 
human norovirus, a primary cause of gastrointestinal disease. Through their study, they 
simulated vomiting, which is a common symptom with many highly infectious diseases. The 
results conclude that droplets, from body fluid, are important in the route of transmission of 
disease.  If these droplets were to land on a HCWs PPE, there is potential for self-contamination 
if the PPE is not doffed properly (Tung-Thompson et al., 2015). Lastly, Casanova et al. (2018) 
specifically analyzed the PPE that is worn by HCWs treating Ebola patients utilizing 
bacteriophage Φ6 and MS2. This study analyzed doffing procedures by highly experienced 
HCWs and also added the use of alcohol based hand rub (ABHR) during the doffing process. 
The use of bacteriophage MS2, as a surrogate non enveloped virus, provides evidence of the 
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longevity of the virus on PPE and how important proper doffing technique is for HCW to prevent 
self-contamination (Casanova et al., 2018).  
Self-contamination from Personal Protective Equipment 
 There is a significant threat to the health and safety of healthcare workers that provide 
patient care to individuals with highly infectious pathogens. As PPE is vital in their protection 
against transmission of the disease, analyzing the survivability of the virus on their PPE, along 
with the potential for self-contamination has gained interest in the research field. Studies such as 
Brown et al. (2016), Casanova et al. (2010a), and Casanova et al. (2013) have all document the 
survivability of virus on PPE.  Casanova et al. (2010a) confirmed in this study that enveloped 
virus can survive for up to 24 hours on PPE, which is much longer than a standard patient care 
session (approximately 30 minutes for non- containment).  Casanova et al. (2013) discovered 
that an enveloped surrogate virus can persist on a N95 respirator for many hours (87 at 40% RH) 
if contaminated during patient care. Lastly, Brown et al. (2016) studied survivability and 
disinfection of surrogate virus on Tyvek suits, which is a common type of PPE used in high 
containment situations. This study again confirmed that enveloped virus survives on PPE longer 
than the standard patient encounter (Brown et al., 2016). From these studies, the importance of 
preventing self-contamination is demonstrated. 
Several different perspectives have been addressed on how to determine how and if self-
contamination occurs during the doffing process of PPE after patient care. A study by Bell et al. 
(2015) utilized the use of fluorescent markers to show how and where a HCW self-contaminates 
themselves during the doffing process. This study analyzed two sets of PPE, one commercially 
provided set for EVD patient care, and the other set of PPE that would be available at a hospital.  
Both sets of PPE were simulated with a splash to show how body fluids from a sick patient can 
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contaminate PPE. While all HCWs in the study were highly training on doffing techniques, the 
results of the study showed that self-contamination still occurred at least once with each set of 
PPE (Bell et al., 2015).  
 Another study by Chughtai et al. (2018) utilized the fluorescent markers and analyzed 10 
different methods for doffing contaminated PPE to determine if one method would lessen the 
chances of self-contamination.  PPE doffing methods were simulated from the World Health 
Organization, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Health Canada and European standard 
operating procedures. With 30 trained HCW volunteers, over 13% had self-contamination 
between the different PPE doffing methods. Overall, the least amount of self-contamination was 
discovered to be with the use of protocols that utilized a PAPR unit and also those with assisted 
doffing techniques.  This study provides evidence that proper doffing technique is essential in 
protecting the HCW from self-contamination (Chughtai et al., 2018).  A study by Zellmer et al. 
(2015) analyzed 30 HCWs and the doffing technique they were trained on prior to patient care. 
The study found that only 17% of the HCWs doffed their PPE as they were previously trained. 
Furthermore, the HCWs did not remove their PPE in the trained location in the patient room 
(Zellmer et al., 2015). Both of these findings are likely to lead to self-contamination when 
doffing contaminated PPE.  A study by Tomas et al. (2015) also used fluorescents and 
bacteriophage MS2 to analyze how HCW self-contaminate during the doffing process. This 
study analyzed over 435 glove and gown doffing sessions within a 4 hospital system. Out of the 
435 sessions, self-contamination occurred 46% of the time. While more self-contamination 
occurred with glove removal, than the gowns, they discovered that when being observed by a 
trainer or other HCW, less self-contamination was discovered (Tomas et al., 2015).  
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 Furthermore, two studies by Casanova et al. (2016) and Casanova et al. (2018) 
specifically researched the doffing procedure of PPE while wearing EVD specific PPE. The 
study by Casanova et al. (2016) utilized bacteriophage MS2 (non-enveloped virus) and 
bacteriophage Φ6 (enveloped virus) to study self-contamination due to PPE doffing. The HCWs 
in this study were also professionally trained on how to doff their PPE. The results confirmed 
self-contamination (specifically with bacteriophage MS2) on their hands for 8 out of 15 HCWs 
(Casanova et al., 2016).  Lastly, the study by Casanova et al. (2018) was conducted in a medical 
biocontainment unit using their standard operating procedures for doffing PPE.  Again, this study 
analyzed bacteriophage MS2 (non-enveloped virus) and bacteriophage Φ6 (enveloped virus) for 
self-contamination on PPE and utilized ABHR in their doffing procedures. Through thorough 
and observed doffing training and techniques, along with very highly specialized HCWs, this 
study provided evidence that in conjunction with ABHR on hands, self- contamination did not 
occur for enveloped virus (Casanova et al., 2018). 
Humidity  
 Previous studies have linked together the connection between survival and transmission 
of virus with humidity levels (Yang et al., 2012; Casanova et al., 2010b; and Lowen et al., 2007).  
Specifically, Casanova et al. (2010b) assessed how air temperature and relative humidity effect 
how coronavirus survives on environmental surfaces, such as stainless steel. Overall, this study 
confirmed that virus survival is greater at lower RH levels such as 20% or higher RH such as 
80% RH when compared to a RH around 50% (Casanova et al., 2010b). The link between air 
temperature and relative humidity was also confirmed in this study, as previously noted in 
research conducted by Lowen et al. (2007).  Lowen et al. (2007) demonstrated that viral 
transmission occurred more often at 5 degrees Celsius versus 20 or 30 degrees Celsius.  
13 
 
To continue the research of the relationship between humidity and survivability of virus, 
Prussin et al. (2018) conducted a study specifically looking at a surrogate virus (bacteriophage 
Φ6) and the survival of the surrogate with regards to relative humidity, absolute humidity, and 
temperature. This study analyzed droplets as that is a common form of contamination on HCWs, 
environmental surfaces and PPE. Their results showed that bacteriophage Φ6 “survived best at 
high (>85%) and low (<60%) RH”.  Overall, the study results demonstrated that “RH is the most 
important factor in controlling virus infectivity in droplets” (Prussin et al., 2018).  
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MATERIALS AND METHODS 
Virus 
For this experiment, two bacteriophages and corresponding hosts were utilized. 
Bacteriophage (Ø6) and host (Pseudomonas syringae HB10Y) were obtained from Dr. Leonard 
Mindich, University of Medicine and Dentistry New Jersey. The second bacteriophage (MS2) 
and host (Escherichia coli Famp) utilized in this experiment were obtained from Dr. Mark 
Sobsey, University of North Carolina – Chapel Hill.  Host bacteria were stored in tryptic soy 
broth containing 20% (v/v) glycerol at -80C until use. For preparation of host culture for virus 
assay, Pseudomonas syringae bacteria was prepared by adding 1 mL of frozen host to 100 mL of 
tryptic soy broth.  This mixture was placed on a rotating shaker (100 rpm, 210 C) for 18-24 
hours. The second host, E. coli Famp, was prepared by scraping a small amount of frozen 
bacteria using a sterile wooden stick and adding to 25 mL of tryptic soy broth. Famp was placed 
on a rotating shaker (100rpm, 370 C) for 18-24 hours.  As the E. coli Famp must be utilized 
during a log phase of growth, at 24 hours, 1 mL of the overnight host culture was placed in 100 
mL fresh TSB, and placed on a rotating shaker (100 rpm, 370 C) for 2-4 hours until growth was 
clearly visible in the media. Top agar was prepared by the addition of agar to tryptic soy broth to 
a final concentration of 0.75% agar). For the MS2 portion of the assay, the top agar had 1 mL 
streptomycin/ampicillin added for every 100 mL of agar (USEPA Method 1602 is the reference 
here). Bottom agar was tryptic soy agar.  
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Titer Assay 
Prior to the start of the time point experiments, each bacteriophage had a titer assay 
completed to determine the concentration of the virus stock (~10 10 PFU/mL). The Ø 6 and MS2 
virus stock solutions (~10 10 PFU/mL) were both thawed and a dilution series was made with a 
target of ~10 8 PFU/mL. 100uL of each  ~10 8 PFU/mL virus solution (each) was then mixed 1:1 
for a final target concentration of ~10 7 PFU/mL of each virus in the mixture. Virus mixture was 
used immediately after preparation. 
Survival Experiment  
Carriers were prepared by taking the shroud of a Powered Air Purifying Respirator 
(PAPR) (3M) and cutting the shroud material into 1 cm2 squares. For each experiment, 10uL of 
the mixed virus solution mixture was placed onto each separate carrier.  For the zero time point, 
three carriers were immediately placed into separate 50mL conical tubes with 1mL of 1.5% beef 
extract, pH 7.5, as the eluent. The three conical tubes were then placed on a rotating shaker (60 
rpm, 210 C) for 20 minutes. 
For the remaining time points (1.5, 2, 4, 6, 8 and 24 hours), 10uL of the virus mixture 
was placed onto three additional PAPR material carriers and positioned on a petri dish within a 
controlled humidity chamber at 45% (±2%) relative humidity (created by placing a saturated 
solution of magnesium chloride in a sealed chamber. Once each time point was reached, each 
carrier was immediately placed into an individual 50mL conical tubes with 1mL of 1.5% beef 
extract, pH 7.5, as the eluent. The three conical tubes were then placed on a rotating shaker (60 
rpm, 210 C) for 20 minutes. Additionally, the determined drying time for the virus mixture was 
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determined to be 1.5 hours at 45% RH.  Relative humidity of the environmental chamber was 
monitored during each experiment.  
Each of the six conical tube’s mixture was diluted out to 5 dilutions. Additionally, the 
virus mixture stock solution was diluted out to 5 dilutions. For each dilution, the double agar 
layer (DAL) plaque assay method was utilized with tryptic soy agar (TSA) plates. Each virus 
dilution, and corresponding top agar and host culture were mixed and distributed to individual 
TSA bottom agar plates. The Ø6 plates were incubated at 210 for 20-24 hours and the MS2 plates 
were incubated at 370 C for 20-24 hours.  After each overnight incubation, the plates were read 
on a light box, plaques counted and the results were logged.  
Statistical Analysis  
 Each time point was analyzed for virus survival and stated as log10 (Nt /N0) for analysis.  
Nt denotes the virus concentration measured in PFU/mL at each time point, t.  N0  represents the 
original virus concentration in PFU/mL at time point zero for the (3) control samples for each 
time point.  
 Two programs were used for the statistical analysis of the data.  Excel 2016 (Microsoft 
Corp.) and GraphPad Prism version 5 (GraphPad, San Diego, CA).  For each virus, the mean of 
log10 (Nt /N0) for each time point was utilized to complete a linear regression analysis. 
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RESULTS 
Figures 4.1 and 4.2, below, display the survival of bacteriophage MS2 and Φ6 over a 24 hour 
time period at 45% RH. The p value for both bacteriophages is greater than 0.05; therefore, not 
statistically significant.  
45% RH MS2
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Figure 1. Survival of bacteriophage MS2 over 24 hours at 45% RH.
6 trials per point; 6 time points of observed data=points; bars=95% CI; linear
regression analysis=line.
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Figure 4.1 Survival of bacteriophage MS2 over 24 hours at 45% 
RH. 6 trials per point; 6 time points of observed data=points; 
ba s=95% CI: linear regression analysis=line 
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Table 4.1: Slope of regression lines for virus inactivation of MS2 at 45% RH 
RH Slope 95% CI P value 
45% -0.0099 +/- .1383         >0.05 
 
Table 4.1 displays the slope of the regression line with 95% CI at 45% RH for MS2. At 45% RH, 
the slope was -0.0099 ± 0.0054. The p value was >0.05; therefore, not statistically significant.  
 
45%RH Phi6
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Figure 1. Survival of bacteriophage phi6 over 24 hours at 45% RH.
6 trials per point; 6 time points of observed data=points; bars=95% CI; linear
regression analysis=line.
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Figure 4.2 Survival of bacteriophage Φ6 over 24 hours at 45% RH. 6 
trials per point; 6 time points of observed data=points; bars=95% CI: 
linear regression analysis=line 
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Table 4.2: Slope of regression lines for virus inactivation of Φ6 at 45% RH 
RH Slope 95% CI P value 
45% -0.028 +/- 0.548 >0.05 
 
Table 4.2 displays the slope of the regression line with 95% CI at 45% RH for Φ6. At 45% RH, 
the slope was -0.028 ± 0.027. The p value was >0.05; therefore, not statistically significant.  
 
Table 4.3: Projected time (estimated in hours) for log reductions for phi6 and MS2 
inactivation at 45% RH 
45% RH Reduction { log10 (Nt/N0)} Inactivation Time (hour projection) 
Phi6 -1 (90%) 24 
-2 (99%) 72 
-3 (99.9%) 96 
-4 (99.99%) 128 
 
MS2 -1 (90%) 96 
 
-2 (99%) 192 
-3 (99.9%) 
 
 
288 
-4 (99.99%) 384 
 
Table 4.3 displays the projected log reduction was calculated from the regression lines for both 
phi6 and MS2. Reduction of both viruses is estimated for 90%, 99%, 99.9%, and 99.99%. While 
phi6 is estimated to have a ~1 log10 reduction at 24 hours at 45% RH, MS2 is estimated to have a 
~1 log10 reduction by 96 hours.  MS2 is estimated to only have a .25 log10 reduction at 24 hours 
at 45% RH. The longest patient encounter, while wearing a PAPR hood, is projected to be 8 
hours. If a HCW were to be contaminated during their patient contact time, the virus is still 
active once the HCW doffs their PPE.  
20 
 
DISCUSSION 
Discussion 
The focus of this study was to analyze the survival of bacteriophage MS2 and Φ6 at 45% 
relative humidity over a 24 hour period on shroud hood material from PAPRs. . While the 
projected time for a HCW to wear a shroud PAPR hood is up to 8 hours in a high containment 
hospital setting, survival up to 24 hours was examined.  Through the results of the current study, 
analyzing both enveloped and non-enveloped virus on shroud PAPR hood material,  similar 
conclusions could be  drawn when compared with previous studies such as Casanova et al. 
(2010) and Brown et al. (2016). These studies demonstrated that enveloped and non-enveloped 
virus can survive on PPE items for up to 24 hours or more.  The current research established that 
both bacteriophages, Φ6 and MS2, underwent only X log reduction over 24 hours. While phi6 
demonstrated a decrease in titer over the 24-hour window, (approximately a 1 log10 decrease 
after 24 hours,) MS2 bacteriophage showed a decrease of only ~ 0.25 log10 at 24 hours.  To reach 
a ~4 log10 reduction for Φ6, extrapolation of results showed, would take approximately 96 hours. 
In the same time period of approximately 96 hours, there would be a reduction of only ~1 log10 
for MS2; the results show a much longer survivability for non-enveloped virus.   
Studies by Casanova et al. (2013) and Prussin et al. (2018) demonstrated survival on 
environmental surfaces at RH levels ranging from 20% to 98% RH. These studies provide 
evidence that RH is an essential variable influencing the survival of both types of viruses. 
Prussin et al. (2018) states that “relative humidity is the most important factor in controlling 
virus infectivity in droplets”. Relative humidity, in conjunction with temperature, affects the 
virus through what Prussin et al. (2018) believe is an “interaction between droplet 
physiochemical characteristics and virus physiology”.  As relative humidity has played a role in 
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survivability of virus, the 45% RH in this study confirms the results from studies such as Prussin 
et al. (2018). Their study researched several relative humidity levels ranging from 23% to 98% 
RH, along with additional factors such as absolute humidity and temperature.  This study done at 
45% RH, falls in line with conclusions from other studies about how RH affects virus on 
surfaces, and in this case, shroud PAPR hood material (Prussin et al., 2018). 
Furthermore, the results of this study are similar to previous research on survival of Ebola 
virus (enveloped) specifically (Schuit et al. (2016), Cook et al. (2015), and Sagripanti and Lytle 
(2011)).  Schuit et al.’s (2016) research studied different surfaces such as stainless steel and 
polypropylene, which are common hospital materials, and contaminated those surfaces with 
Ebola virus. Their conclusions were similar in that the results showed survival much longer than 
24 hours, specifically, Sagripanti et al. demonstrated only a 0.68 log reduction over a 24 hour 
period. Additionally, Sagripanti and Lytle (2011) provided evidence that even with ultraviolet 
radiation, which is a common method for decontamination for infectious substances, Ebola virus 
did not fully inactivate on a non-porous surface even with 254-nm radiation over six selected 
time periods, not exceeding 30 seconds.  Cook et al. (2015) showed that Ebola virus can persist 
up to 192 hours on steel and plastic surfaces, again, both types of surfaces commonly found in a 
hospital setting. Furthermore, there is only a 4 log reduction at 365 hours for stainless steel. The 
Cook et al. (2015) study continued to provide evidence that proper decontamination of surfaces 
requires strict contact times and a disinfectant proven to inactivate the virus in question.  
 Additional information from the current study confirms the potential for self-
contamination during the doffing process is a possibility as both Φ6 and MS2, have longevity on 
PPE longer than a typical 8 hour patient care time period. This means that virus may still be 
present at high concentrations on PAPR material when it is time for the HCW to remove the 
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PAPR. Studies such as Mumma et al. (2018), Casanova et al. (2018), Suen et al. (2018), Verbeek 
et al. (2016), and Zellmer et al. (2015) have demonstrated that even after extensive training on 
proper doffing techniques, self –contamination during doffing is still of great concern for HCW. 
With the potential for highly infectious substances remaining on shroud PAPR hoods after 
patient care, the doffing process is critical in prevention of transmission of the virus to not only 
the HCW, but also to other environmental surfaces and potentially other individuals. Mumma et 
al. (2018) analyzed 11 trained HCWs through the doffing process of PPE, including a PAPR 
unit. The study utilized human factors, fault tree analysis and behavioral coding to determine the 
steps of contamination. Overall, the results demonstrated 51 types of errors that could lead to 
self-contamination or the spread of contamination to other surfaces by the HCW doffing 
techniques. Specifically, PAPR hood doffing was one of the riskiest processes and the study 
showed that many errors occurred in that step of doffing. By analyzing each detailed step of the 
doffing process, the steps of self-contamination can be identified and solutions to prevent these 
occurrences can be put into place (Mumma et al., 2018). A study by Casanova et al. (2018) 
analyzed the specific doffing procedures for 10 HCWs that wear specifically, Ebola-level PPE. 
This study utilized both enveloped and non-enveloped bacteriophages, trained observers, and 
also utilized the alcohol based hand rub within the doffing procedures.  The outcome from 
Casanova et al. (2018) confirmed the results of the current study in that if either virus is on Ebola 
type PPE surfaces, self-contamination is possible even with full training and observed doffing. 
Lastly, Suen et al. (2018) studied the doffing process of three types of PPE with 59 participants 
by utilizing a florescent stain to follow the route of transmission. This study showed the viral 
transmission does vary with the PPE that is worn, the ergonomics associated with 
donning/doffing of the PPE, and lastly if the standard protocol is followed or if any deviations 
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from the protocol occur (Suen et al., 2018). All of these studies confirm the findings from the 
current study in that if virus is on PPE, careful attention must be paid to the doffing procedure in 
order to prevent self-contamination to the HCW or their surroundings.  As PPE is essential in the 
safety of the HCW, one specific piece of PPE that must be discussed is respiratory protection.  
 When analyzing PPE for HCW protection, there are two main types of respiratory 
protection, N95 and PAPRs, utilized by HCW when working directly with patients that have a 
highly infectious disease. There have been several studies on which type of respiratory protection 
provides the best protection against transmission and the possibility of self-contamination during 
the doffing process. A review of respiratory protection by Roberts, V. (2014), analyzed both N95 
and PAPR usage amongst HCWs. The review concludes that there are advantages and 
disadvantages of both types of respiratory protection. While the PAPR units provide additional 
protection against droplets, they are more cumbersome, louder (due to the blower unit), and are 
difficult to use with a stethoscope for patient care. N95 respirators can be less expensive and 
more accessible; however, require fit testing prior to usage. Additionally, as N95 respirators fit 
closely to the face, they can cause discomfort due to heat, breathing resistance and can be tight or 
itchy on the facial skin.  Furthermore, both types of respirators require training for proper doffing 
or self-contamination could occur (Roberts, V., 2014).  Additional studies analyzing respiratory 
protection include studies by Hanoa et al. (2016) and MacIntyre et al. (2014). Both of these 
studies break down the variety of respiratory protection and the lack of consensus amongst 
policy makers (internationally and in the United States) on what is the best protection for HCW 
when providing patient care to patients with highly infectious diseases, such as EVD.  Infection 
control programs at hospitals must conduct thorough risk assessments to determine the best type 
of respiratory protection for their staff. As both enveloped and non-enveloped viruses have 
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longevity on PPE, as shown in Casanova et al. (2010) and Brown et al. (2016) studies, providing 
evidence of survivability on shroud PAPR hoods is vital to reinforce the potential danger even 
when utilizing a respirator choice that is more protective than alternatives choices. 
Recommendations 
 On a daily basis, the health and safety of healthcare workers is a top priority.  As highly 
infectious diseases will continue to be a burden worldwide, protecting the people that provide 
patient care to individuals that contract the disease is essential for their health and safety, and 
preventing further spread of the disease. Studies have demonstrated that respiratory protection is 
a vital piece of PPE that can directly protect HCWs from highly infectious diseases; therefore, 
having properly trained HCWs is an essential part of infection control program for hospitals. 
Training these individuals on proper donning and doffing techniques will limit the amount of cases 
of self-contamination from the PPE doffing process. Continued training and competency training 
should play a role in the HCWs in order to maintain their knowledge and proficiency in the doffing 
of their PPE.  
 In addition to strict and practiced doffing procedures, one step of the doffing process should 
include a decontamination step of the PPE, including the PAPR hood.  Several studies, such as 
Casanova et al. (2018) and Brown et al. (2016) have proven that decontaminating the PPE with 
either hypochlorite, a quaternary ammonium compound, or an alcohol based hand rub can greatly 
reduce the potential for viral transmission to other pieces of PPE, the surrounding environment, 
and most importantly, the healthcare worker.  This important step in the doffing process should be 
considered, evaluated, and practiced by hospitals through their infection control procedures.  
Determining which disinfectant is best for their hospital for the doffing process will limit the 
opportunities for self-contamination of the HCW to themselves and surrounding environment.  
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 Furthermore, hospitals should conduct risk assessments to determine the best type of 
respiratory protection for their HCWs when handling the variety of highly infectious agents they 
may come in contact with at their hospital. Analyzing trends for all the respirator types used, such 
as N95, PAPR or a shroud PAPR hood should be reviewed to determine cases of self-
contamination and if standard operating procedures need to be updated or changed. From the 
research of the shroud PAPR hood study with two different bacteriophages, the results only 
strengthen the argument that proper doffing is essential in preventing self-contamination with 
highly infectious pathogens.  
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